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1. Introduction 
How public administration relates to societal actors 
varies considerably between political systems—
variation is seen in how accessible public administra-
tion is to different types of societal actors, how these 
linkages are organised, and what the underlying ra-
tionales are. According to principles of responsive and 
representative public administration the status of un-
elected bureaucracies rests on acquiring “legitimacy 
from below” by connecting directly to the society it is 
supposed to serve (Rothstein, 2012b). At the same 
time, according to Weberian bureaucratic principles a 
main source of legitimacy for a responsible bureaucracy 
is upholding professional standards and applying ex-
pertise and specialised information when policies are 
formulated and implemented (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978; 
Olsen, 2006). From this perspective, public administra-
tion’s relations to society have a different underlying 
rationale: only to the extent that societal actors carry 
with them specialised knowledge and information that 
are instrumental and indispensable to rational policy 
making processes and effective implementation, would 
such actors gain access. By including societal actors in-
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to their information system bureaucracies can draw 
on the expertise that such actors may possess 
(Saurugger 2006). Hence, for responsive and respon-
sible executive organisations how they deal with the 
interface between administration, expertise and soci-
ety in principle becomes important for their legitima-
cy and effectiveness.  
This article examines empirically this nexus—to 
what extent and under what conditions are different 
kinds of societal actors included in expert venues for 
policy making? We analyse these questions in the con-
text of European Union (EU) policy making and the 
elaborate system of expert groups organised by the 
EU’s executive centre—the European Commission 
(Commission). This set of expert venues is the most ex-
tensive organised supranational information system 
and a key feature of everyday governance at the EU 
level, as well as potentially a channel for societal in-
volvement in policy making. Building on previous re-
search on overall patterns of participation (Gornitzka & 
Sverdrup, 2010, 2011) we zoom in on societal actors as 
one of the main types of actors, in addition to national 
administrations and scientists, that the expertise sys-
tem is composed of. The Commission as a “normalised” 
executive (Wille, 2013) can be expected to include so-
cietal actors in the way that other executives do. Yet, 
links with societal groups have been argued to be more 
important for EU executive bodies than for comparable 
administrations at national level since the EU’s politi-
cal-administrative system has traditionally had weakly 
structured connections with society through the “elec-
toral channel”. Studies of interest mediation at the Eu-
ropean level concur in general that the presence of or-
ganised societal and private sector actors has 
developed into an institutionalized part of EU policy 
making (Greenwood, 2007, 2011; Mazey & Richardson, 
2001) with the Commission as its most important con-
tact point (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 2008). Considera-
ble scholarship has established how the Commission and 
societal actors interact through a wide range of modes 
and means of consultation (see Eising, 2008), yet less is 
known about how societal actors feature as experts and 
how they participate in specialised, expert venues.  
We unpack the notion of societal actors by looking 
into participation in the expert group system of a broad 
set of societal actors—non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), social partners/unions, consumer organisa-
tions, and business organisations. We know already 
that such groups are present in the expert group sys-
tem (see Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011), but by con-
ducting a more elaborate analysis of the data on partic-
ipation of societal actors in the Commission’s expert 
groups we can shed further light on what kinds of soci-
etal groups are brought into Commission policy making 
as members of expert groups, which factors affect the 
inclusion of such actors, and uncover different “logics 
of inclusion”. 
We take as our point of departure an “executive 
politics” perspective (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012) on the in-
teraction between societal actors and the Commission 
rather than a theory of interest group politics and strat-
egies (Beyers et al., 2008; Coen, 1998). Consequently, 
we focus on organisational factors that shape adminis-
trative behaviour and develop arguments anchored in 
organisation theory about how the executive branch of 
government in general, and the Commission in particu-
lar, can be expected to open up for societal participation 
in the policy making processes through expert venues.  
The article proceeds as follows. First we present the 
analytical framework identifying the factors that can be 
expected to affect the interaction between the Com-
mission and societal actors. The Commission, like na-
tional executives, can be regarded as a multi-
organisation where different departments operate in 
different task environments, under a differentiated and 
specialised formal structure, and where they are carri-
ers of different traditions, norms and practices. We as-
sume that there is considerable variation among the 
Commission’s Directorate Generals (DGs) in the extent 
to which they engage with societal actors and see them 
as relevant experts. Hence, specific arguments that can 
help explain such variation are introduced. In the sub-
sequent section we give a brief presentation of what 
an expert group is, and which data and methods are 
used. Next, the findings on the patterns and configura-
tions of societal participation in the expert group sys-
tem are presented and discussed. Finally, we conclude 
by revisiting the main arguments about the nexus be-
tween administration, expertise, and society in the 
light of our main findings.  
2. The Theoretical Arguments: Organisational Factors 
and the Nexus between Administration, Expertise, 
and Society  
Societal groups can interact with the executive branch 
of government in a number of ways, both in the prepa-
ration and implementation of policies. National execu-
tive bureaucracies vary in how open and pluralistic 
they are in their contacts with society and how institu-
tionalised these interactions are. There are considera-
ble variations in the rules and norms that regulate this 
link (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2003). As the relationship 
between society and public administration is a peren-
nial and contested issue in the social sciences 
(Rothstein, 2012a), the conceptualisations of this rela-
tionship are as varied as its empirical manifestations 
across time and systems. This diversity is also reflected 
in the scholarship on the role of interest groups and 
civil society in European politics and governance. The 
institutionalisation of the European political space 
(Stone Sweet, Fligstein, & Sandholtz, 2001) brought in-
terest groups, once mainly organised within nation-
states, to the European level as they established trans-
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national networks and associations with representa-
tives in Brussels. As the Commission consolidated its 
position as the executive centre in the EU, it became a 
sought-after access point for interest groups more 
broadly and other societal actors. It also actively pro-
moted the establishment of European level organisa-
tions and associations. Interest groups adjusted to the 
multi-arena policy making stemming from the European-
isation of public policy in many sectors (Richardson, 
2000). As pointed to by Mazey and Richardson (2001), 
the Commission came to be seen as entertaining “pro-
miscuous relationships” with societal actors, and it be-
came a type of administration where such actors are 
“pressing against an open door”. Strong arguments were 
made for seeing the European level system of interest 
intermediation as a system of pluralist lobbying 
(Andersen & Eliassen, 1995), but with a bias. The EU as a 
system of governance was seen to privilege mobile capi-
tal interests over diffuse and general societal interests, 
that is, favouring “businessmen’s Europe” (see Pollack, 
1997 for a critical examination of this argument).  
The main body of research on societal actors in the 
EU has employed an interest groups politics perspec-
tive, taking the interest organisations as the unit of 
analysis and studying access and strategies for how to 
influence the EU policy process (Beyers et al., 2008). 
This article takes executive politics and a public admin-
istration perspective as the starting point, shifting the 
analytical attention to the systematic study of the role 
of public administration in the formulation and execu-
tion of political programmes, and the organisational 
factors that structure life in political-administrative in-
stitutions (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012), including its inter-
action with non-government organisations.  
According to such a perspective, a key to under-
standing bureaucratic behaviours, including their 
openness towards their environment, lies in how an 
administrative organisation is structured (Simon, 
1976[1945]). Public officials do not only look “upward” 
along the organisational hierarchy and political leader-
ship for guidance and decision making premises. Bu-
reaucratic organisations as open systems can also be 
expected to seek predictable and regularised relation-
ships with their task environments. Such a conception 
of executive organisations postulates an interactive re-
lationship between societal actors and public admin-
istration. But it does not see bureaucracies as envi-
ronmentally determined, that is, executives are not the 
derivative of social forces and agencies prone to be 
“captured” by the societal actors with whom bureau-
cracies interact. Rather, public agencies as institutions 
have a basis for independent action and capacity to 
manage their relations to external constituents (March 
& Olsen, 1989). 
Why would executive organisations engage with 
societal actors? Bureaucracies can, based on an in-
strumental logic, connect and open up for societal par-
ticipation to satisfy, or satisfice (Simon, 1976[1945]), its 
information needs and for channelling knowledge and 
information to the appropriate decision-points. Bu-
reaucracies with limited in-house capacity operating in 
shifting and complicated environments have to rely on 
external information. Including societal actors is part of 
their search for information, a search that can be both 
supply and demand driven (March, 1994), and an es-
sential part of what bureaucracies do. The Commission 
is no different in this respect from other executive or-
ganisations—it might even be more dependent on 
drawing on outside policy advice and capacity for im-
plementation than national administrations given the 
nature of the European administrative space. Interest 
groups carry information that are access goods in their 
interaction with the Commission (Bouwen, 2004)1. The 
Commission’s officials can be expected to be particu-
larly interested in cultivating a relationship with corpo-
rate actors and organised interest groups as providers 
of factual information in complex policy areas 
(Broscheid & Coen, 2007; Coen, 1997). In addition, we 
know from the study of interest group strategies that 
interest groups and civil society organisations at the EU 
level are professionalising, which also involves empha-
sising their qualities as expertise organisations 
(Saurugger, 2006). Private sector actors may, for in-
stance, possess a type of professional and technical 
know-how stemming from everyday interaction with 
sectors of society—a kind of hands-on knowledge that 
bureaucracies at national or supranational level do not 
have. Consequently, accessing societal actors’ exper-
tise is a likely rationale for the Commission to include 
such organisations into the policy process. 
Societal actors will also have political information, 
that is, information about sectoral organisations’ and 
grass root preferences. Such preferences could be im-
portant for the fate of the Commission’s proposals at 
veto-points in the inter-institutional process of decision 
making in the EU and for anticipating possible mobilisa-
tion of societal actors through media or other means. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of societal actors into policy 
making and implementing EU policies can increase the 
likelihood that such policies are accepted and complied 
with by affected parties. In this way including societal 
actors into expert venues can be a way for bureaucra-
cies to monitor and interpret their technical and politi-
cal environments.  
A second set of rationales for societal inclusion 
concerns bureaucracies as legitimacy seeking organisa-
tions acting according to a logic of appropriateness. We 
know that bureaucratic behaviour is guided by multiple 
                                                          
1 Note that Bouwen’s argument refers to the logic of lobbying 
of business interest in the Commission and the European Par-
liament within the context of the internal market. The society 
interests that can be activated as participants in the Commis-
sion expert groups are much broader. 
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norms that reflect different perceptions of what public 
administration is. Concerns for political loyalty and 
administrative effectiveness (public administration as 
an instrument for political leadership), neutrality and 
professional standards in bureaucratic action (“respon-
sible administration”) blend and collide with each oth-
er and with concerns for “affected parties” and the 
sectors it is set to serve (“responsive administration”) 
(Egeberg, 1999). As we have pointed to already, the 
authority and legitimacy of a bureaucracy can also be 
derived from its ability to be responsive to socio-
economic interest groups, beyond the instrumental 
value of including “society” in the formulation and exe-
cution of policy. Consequently, there is a potential ten-
sion here between the inclusion based on concerns for 
interest representation and one based on concerns for 
drawing on a specialised knowledge that such actors 
bring to the table. 
We can expect that in the case of the Commission 
how such concerns are mixed and balanced will affect 
the propensity to include societal actors in expert ven-
ues. The Commission does not have formal, clear and 
precise obligations to consult societal actors in general 
(de Vlieger & Tanasescu, 2011). Yet, according to 
norms of a responsive public administration, the Com-
mission is expected to be sensitive to principles of in-
clusiveness and balanced representation of expertise 
and interests in its composition of expert groups. If the 
latter is indeed an active norm in administrative behav-
iour in the Commission we will expect to see the fol-
lowing patterns. Firstly, inclusion of societal actors in 
expert venues would be a general feature of the Com-
mission. Secondly, and in line with the notion of plural-
istic corporatism, the information system would recog-
nise the need to balance information from different 
interests in society, especially with respect to the eco-
nomic cleavage lines (employers versus employees and 
producers versus consumers). Hence, the Commission 
can be expected to use a heterogeneity principle in the 
composition of its expert group system in order to sig-
nal balanced representation and avoid allegations of 
favouritism and “corporate capture”.  
In sum, establishing and maintaining manageable 
relationships with organised interest groups, corporate 
actors, civil society association, etc., would be im-
portant for a bureaucracy seeking to secure a stable 
environment, to enhance its political effectiveness to-
wards other EU institutions (Mazey & Richardson, 
2001), but also for acting according to norms of good, 
societally responsive administrative behaviour.  
However, an executive politics perspective also 
recognises that bureaucracies are not monolithic struc-
tures. Variation in organisational properties within bu-
reaucracies and the environments within which they 
operate affects their actions, including how they inter-
act with societal actors. Hence, we have to pay atten-
tion to possible variations in patterns of societal partic-
ipation in expert venues and how such variations can 
be accounted for. 
2.1. Division of Competencies across Levels of 
Government 
The Commission is positioned in a multi-level political-
administrative order and has varying bases for acting 
independently from member states. This is defined by 
the distribution of legal competences across levels of 
government. Legal competences are a basic parameter 
for the Commission’s autonomy of action, and are also 
a part of the formal structure that varies between the 
policy domains within which the Commission operates. 
In some areas the EU holds exclusive competences, in 
others competences are shared, and in some areas the 
competences of the EU are more limited and primarily 
related to supporting and supplementing the national 
level. Given the propensity of the Commission to build 
up a transnational civil society in tandem with delega-
tion of power to the supranational level (see above), 
we expect that the Commission is more likely to in-
clude societal actors in areas where the Commission 
has a strong Treaty basis for independent action there-
by underlining its autonomy from member states. In 
order to test the significance of legal competences for 
societal inclusion we attributed the competences dis-
tribution in the Treaties to the various policy areas: 1 = 
supporting/complementary, 2 = coordinating, 3 = 
shared, 4 = exclusive2. 
2.2. Bureaucratic Specialisation and Tasks 
The principle of specialisation is the second fundamental 
organisational property of the Commission—a striking 
feature of the Commission’s administrative apparatus 
and the portfolio allocation to each Commissioner is that 
they are arranged along sectoral lines (Egeberg, 2006). 
From the study of public administration at the national 
level and several observations on the Commission as a 
multi-organisation, we can expect to find strong sec-
torally segmented interaction patterns between the DGs 
and specialised societal groups. The internal organisa-
tion of the Commission affects its interaction with out-
side constituents. We could, for instance, expect to see 
DGs dealing with the regulation of the internal market to 
include business actors more than DGs that relate to 
other sectors of society. With the data that are available 
                                                          
2 Coding legal competences is difficult. We have used the allo-
cation of competences as they are presented in the treaties. 
For instance, fishery policy is coded as a policy field where the 
EU holds exclusive EU competences (value 4), whereas in the 
field of education and culture the EU holds supporting compe-
tences (value 1). Note that the coding has been done regarding 
policy themes, and not the DG, since a single DG can be in-
volved in policy areas with different legal competences. 
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to us we cannot examine this in full, but we probe this 
expectation by looking at overall patterns of participa-
tion in expert groups and which DGs that tend to include 
societal actors in their expert venues.  
Bureaucratic organisation also involves the specifi-
cation of tasks. We can assume that type of primary 
task of the DG is relevant for their external contact pat-
terns, including their propensity to include societal ac-
tors as experts. We assume that internal services de-
partments will not be prone to seek information from 
outside experts in the same way as DGs involved in 
specialised sectors of society. We expect that DGs 
managing the EU’s spending programmes and those 
DGs that develop new legislation are more likely to in-
clude the targets of policies in the policy making pro-
cess compared to DGs that are primarily charged with 
regulation and enforcement of existing EU law. The lat-
ter departments would be more reluctant to potential-
ly compromise their neutrality in the exercise of their 
tasks. For investigating these expectations we examine 
a simple frequency distribution of societal inclusion in 
expert groups according to types of DGs and include 
this variable in our multivariate model. For categorisa-
tion of type of task and coding of DGs we rely on Kas-
sim et al. (2013, pp. 20, 25-26), who use the following 
categories: internal services/support, external relations 
of the EU, legislative (producing new legislation) regu-
latory/enforcement (upkeep and enforcement of ac-
quis communautaire/comitology), research, and spend-
ing (management of EU’s spending programmes).  
Tasks of the administration also vary in the course 
of a policy process. A standard mode of describing de-
cision making in political systems is to separate the pol-
icy-making process into various stages, from agenda 
setting, policy formulation, decision stage, to imple-
mentation and evaluation (Lasswell, 1956). Although 
studies of actual decision making show that there is of-
ten no natural sequence nor clear distinction between 
the different stages and that these stages are simplifi-
cations (Jann & Wegrich, 2007), separating between 
policy stages is still analytically helpful for grasping the 
relationship between administrative task structure and 
the Commission’s inclusion of societal actors. The 
“stages heuristic” can capture variation in type of ac-
tors that participate throughout the policy process 
(Parag, 2008). This can tell us what type of policy tasks 
that prompts the Commission to seek such actors’ in-
volvement, and what roles the administration assigns 
to such actors in the policy process. In order to test this 
relationship we use data on the tasks specified for each 
expert group. We distinguish between the following 
tasks: groups that assist the Commission in the prepa-
ration of legislation or in policy definition (“Assist in 
preparation”), suggesting a more technically and spe-
cific policy shaping task for expert consultations; 
groups that provide expertise to the Commission when 
drafting or implementing measures before the Com-
mission submits these draft measures to a comitology 
committee (“draft implementation”), which is also a 
highly specialised task; groups that coordinate with 
member states and promote the exchange of views be-
tween actors (“exchange of view- coordination”), 
which indicates a more loose “forum” function for ex-
pert involvement; and groups that monitor the devel-
opment of national policies and the enforcement of EU 
policies (“monitoring”), where experts are engaged as 
watchdogs for the Commission.  
2.3. Institutionalisation and Bureaucratic Traditions 
We can expect bureaucratic traditions for handling pol-
icy areas at the European level to affect the openness 
of the Commission towards societal actors. Some policy 
fields have been subjected to European governance for 
a longer period of time than others. According to insti-
tutional theory (March & Olsen, 1995) we could expect 
that over time, processes of institutionalisation, rou-
tinisation, and development of shared experiences, 
understandings and meanings, might reduce the num-
ber of disputes and uncertainties in developing policy 
and implementing them. Consequently, the Commis-
sion can be assumed to have more discretion in older 
policy fields than in more recent additions to EU execu-
tive politics. Hence, in the older fields there is less need 
to consult with external actors. 
The alternative expectation to consider is that also 
the mode of consultation/interaction in itself, that is, 
repeated, long-term interaction between the Commis-
sion administration and societal groups, becomes rou-
tinised and institutionalised. In areas where the Com-
mission is less of an “adolescent bureaucracy” including 
societal actors may have become a standard operating 
procedure for processing policy issues (Mazey & 
Richardson, 2005). This effect could also be reinforced 
by formalising the consultative arrangements. If this is 
indeed a mechanism, we should expect to see more so-
cietal inclusion in expert venues that are formal and 
permanent. Testing these expectations in depth will re-
quire qualitative data that our sources do not provide, 
yet as an approximation we use the variable “portfolio 
age” based on data on year for the creation of DG port-
folios, as measured by Broscheid and Coen (2007), and 
variables measuring formalisation of Commission’s ex-
pert groups (expert groups characteristics: formal versus 
informal and permanent versus temporary). 
2.4. DG Environmental Pressure 
Different DGs face varying types of uncertainties and 
operate in different task environments. An environ-
mental factor with particular relevance for societal par-
ticipation is the density of interest groups in a policy 
area that operate at the European level. Social actors 
recognise expert groups as an important policy venue, 
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and they can use such organised links to further their 
interests (Peters, 1995) and to legitimise activities vis-
à-vis their own constituency and membership. Business 
associations target the Commission working level most 
frequently in their efforts to influence EU decision mak-
ing (Eising, 2007; Kriesi, Tresch, & Jochum, 2007). In 
some policy areas the interest group activity is dense, 
while in other areas there is a much lower interest group 
activity (Broscheid & Coen, 2007; Mazey & Richardson, 
2001). In some areas expertise is to a large extent mo-
nopolised by national governments. In these areas the 
Commission will have less available relevant expertise 
from societal actors to draw on and also faces less pres-
sure for participation from organised interest groups. 
This we can expect will influence the Commission’s pro-
pensity to open up for societal participation. Based on 
this argument one can expect to see more inclusion of 
societal actors in expert groups in policy areas where 
there is a high density of interest groups. In order to 
examine this relationship we use data from the 
Coneccs data basis3, indicating the number of interest 
groups operating at the EU level in relation to various 
DGs. 
3. Data and Methods 
The analysis is based on data from a database of the 
Commission expert groups (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 
2011). Formally, an expert group is a consultative enti-
ty comprising external experts advising the Commis-
sion and our database provides information on key 
properties of these groups (N = 1236). When construct-
ing the database we used information from the Com-
mission’s register of expert groups from January 2007. 
The database includes all formal and informal groups 
registered as active at the time45. Defining and catego-
rising societal actors is not a straightforward and un-
controversial matter (Beyers et al., 2008). In fact, major 
political controversy has arisen over this issue—
especially whether strong corporate interests have 
been included guised as expert group members acting in 
their “personal capacity” (see e.g. Nielsen, 2015)6. For 
                                                          
3 Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society 
(Coneccs) was the Commission’s database of civil society or-
ganisations active at the EU level. We use data from 2007. 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/coneccs/index.html 
4 Independent experts assisting the Commission in evaluating 
proposals and monitor projects in the implementation of activ-
ities in the area of research and technological development are 
not included. 
5 We know that the number of expert groups registered has 
dropped since 2007 and that some of high end users of expert 
groups have in absolute terms cut considerably in the number 
of groups they operate (Hartlapp, Metz, & Rauh, 2014, pp. 214-
216), yet how these changes have affected the overall patterns 
of participation has so far not been documented. 
6 See e.g. https://euobserver.com/justice/127440 
the purpose of the analysis presented in this article we 
use the following broad categories of organisations that 
are recorded in the registry as members of expert 
groups: “Enterprises and industry” for organisations rep-
resenting business interests and for-profit organisations, 
“Social partners” for organisations representing the in-
terests of European employers and workers (trade un-
ions), “non-governmental organisations—NGOs” for 
non-profit organisations of general or single societal in-
terests, “consumers” for organisations representing con-
sumer interests, and “practitioners” to cover profession-
al associations. Operationalisations and additional data 
sources for independent variables used in the analyses 
are presented and discussed in the theoretical section.  
We run three different analyses of societal actors in 
expert groups. First, we examine the configuration of 
participants in expert groups. For this purpose we use a 
simple bivariate correlation analysis. When we exam-
ine the organisational factors that affect the inclusion 
of societal actors in expert groups we use a simple fre-
quency distribution according to the DGs and types of 
DGs, and a multivariate linear regression model with the 
participation of societal actors as dependent variable 
and the expert group as the unit of analysis. The multi-
variate model used here (Table 5, Table 6 and Appendix) 
is an elaboration from the Gornitzka and Sverdrup 
(2011) multivariate model and adds theoretically rele-
vant independent variables to the model by including 
types of tasks/policy stage and institutionalization of ex-
pert venue as variables. This model is also used with dif-
ferent types of societal actors as dependent variables.  
The dependent variables are binary codes (participa-
tion of a type of actor in an expert group = 1 versus non-
participation = 0), hence logistic regression rather than 
ordinary least square (OLS) is the preferred method. 
However, as the two methods produce very similar re-
sults when the distribution of the dependent variable is 
not too skewed (about .25/.75) and as OLS coefficients 
are much more readily interpreted (Christophersen, 2006; 
Hellevik, 2009; Pohlman & Leitner, 2003), OLS regression 
is used for the main model (Table 5). Logistic regression 
is used for analysis reported in Table 6 and the Appendix.  
Some clarifications regarding expert groups are in 
order. The composition of the group reflects the choic-
es made by the Commission, most of them at the level 
of DGs and their units. As pointed to earlier, interaction 
between societal actors and the EU executive bodies 
does not take place via such expert venues alone—and 
we make no attempt here to cover the full spectre of 
societal involvement and the Commission’s modes of 
consultation. The focus here is solely on the expert 
groups in the Commission. When examining patterns of 
participation, we should also keep in mind that those 
actors that are included as experts in such groups do 
not necessarily become influential. Recent research on 
the influence of expert groups point to how expert 
groups vary in their influence on the Commission posi-
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tions (Hartlapp et al., 2014). Our data do not allow us 
to follow up on the impact of such groups and the ex-
tent to which patterns of participation are related to 
the relative influence of the advice provided by the ex-
pert groups on policy making and implementation. Nor 
can we examine the dynamics and influence of actors 
within these groups. Roles might be blurred and partic-
ipants might operate with mixed allegiances (Egeberg, 
Schaefer, & Trondal, 2003), e.g. in the case of societal 
actors, the role of representing particular interests 
might be blended with an expert-oriented, epistemic 
role, or it might be moulded by within-group socialisa-
tion and deliberations. Consequently, we cannot make 
claims about the actual behaviour within the expert 
group system nor the effect that such participation has 
on the policy content. The type of quantitative analysis 
of patterns of participation that we conduct here does 
allow us to make claims about the access of types of 
actors in the EU’s expert venues and this we argue is 
important for flows of information in EU policy making. 
4. Societal Actors in the Commission’s Expert 
Venues—The Findings 
About 500 expert groups (40 per cent) feature societal 
actors of different sorts (Table 1, see also Gornitzka and 
Sverdrup 2011). Since taking part in expert groups rep-
resents a more organised kind of interaction between 
societal actors and the EU executive than bilateral and 
interest group initiated lobbying, this pattern of partici-
pation indicates that the Commission frequently involves 
societal actors fairly closely in its specialised policy mak-
ing venues. This could be both the expression of the in-
strumental value that DGs attach to interacting with so-
cietal actors, and a reflection of the norms of openness 
and inclusion of affected parties, corporate actors and 
civil society into ordinary policy making at DG unit lev-
el/the Commission’s administrative level.  
These data also uncover that among the societal ac-
tors, groups representing business and enterprise are 
the most frequent participants in the Commission ex-
pert groups (present in 29 per cent of the groups), rank-
ing far above the presence of NGOs (Table 1). This might 
seem to support the idea that the Commission gives 
privileged access and attention to business/industry ex-
pertise, interests and views, indicating a business bias 
of the Commission’s interaction patterns. On the other 
hand in absolute numbers the presence of NGOs and 
organisations representing consumer interests is not 
negligible. And taken together NGOs, consumer and 
professional organisations are present in more in 28 
per cent of the expert groups, that is, they are as fre-
quently included as the businesses/enterprises. Fur-
thermore, these results have to been seen in relation 
to the pattern of participation of national ministries 
and agencies: the overall participation of societal ac-
tors is in relative terms dwarfed by the dominance of 
national executives as experts in this type of venue 
(see Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011). 
Judging from the frequency distribution (Table 1), 
the presence of social partners and unions (12 per cent 
of the expert groups) indicates that the expert group 
system is not primarily a site for traditional corporatist 
arrangements where the executive meets with peak 
associations for employees and employers. Hence, the 
way that the Commission has developed and is using its 
expert group system is more akin to an organised neo-
pluralist system of interaction between the executive 
and social actors. 
Patterns of co-participation (Table 2) also support 
such a conclusion—there are strong correlations be-
tween the participation of different kinds of societal ac-
tors. A principle of heterogeneity also seems to be prac-
ticed by Commission DGs in the way committees are 
composed. The presence of business in an expert group 
is to some degree balanced by participation from con-
sumer organisations, NGOs and/or social partners/unions. 
From Table 3, we see that participation from all so-
cietal actors, with the exception of professional organi-
sations/practitioners, is negatively correlated with par-
ticipation from national ministries, especially in the 
case of consumer organisations and business/industry. 
That is, when national executives close to the political 
apex at the national level interact with the Commission 
in the expert groups, societal actors are to some extent 
excluded from participating. There is no such negative 
relationship found for groups where national agencies 
participate—societal actor and agency participation is 
not significantly correlated. Scientists on the other 
hand tend to participate together with societal actors, 
with the exception of consumer organisations. Hence, 
we can conclude that DG units bring together a mixed 
set of societal actors and scientists in venues separate 
from the expert groups that bring DG units in interac-
tion with member states’ ministries. 
Table 1. Number and Type of Societal Actors Participating 
in European Commission Expert Groups. 2007. N = 1236.  
Type of societal 
actors 
N 
Percentage of all 
expert groups 
Enterprises and 
industry 
352 29 
Social partners/ 
unions 
146 12 
NGOs 207 17 
Consumer 
organisations 
96 8 
Practitioners 156 13 
All types of 
societal actors 
498 40 
Source: Own data, see also Gornitzka and Sverdrup 
(2011, p. 55). 
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Table 2. Co-participation of types of societal actors in 
European Commission wxpert groups 2007. Bivariate 
Correlations Pearson’s R. N = 1236. 
 
Social 
partners/ 
Unions 
NGOs 
Consumer 
organisations 
Social partners/ 
Unions 
 1   
NGOs .36**  1  
Consumer 
organisations 
.46** .38**  1 
Enterprises and 
industry 
.35** .39** .40** 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
Table 3. Co-particiation of societal actors, scientists, 
National Ministries and agencies. Bivariate Correlations 
Pearson’s R. N = 1236.  
 
Scientists 
National admin-
istrations/ 
ministries 
Competent 
national 
authorities/ 
agencies 
Social partners/ 
Unions 
.06* -.11** -.02 
NGOs .17** -.09** .04 
Consumer 
organisations 
-.01 -.21** -.09** 
Enterprises and 
Industry 
.22** -.19** -.04 
Practitioners .22** .03 .00 
Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). Source: Own data. 
4.1. Variation according to Commission DGs 
Figure 1 maps the distribution of the number of expert 
groups that include societal actors and relates it to the 
total number of expert groups per DG. Most DGs that 
dispose over a set of expert groups also organise 
groups where societal actors participate. Yet, as ex-
pected, there is strong variation across policy areas 
when it comes to degree of societal actors’ participa-
tion. In absolute numbers the DGs for Research & De-
velopment, Environment, as well as DG Enterprise, or-
ganise most of the expert groups where societal actors 
participate. Relatively speaking, also DG Education & 
Culture and DG for Agriculture are open to societal in-
volvement, as these DGs also include such actors into a 
majority of their expert groups. We see also that the 
DGs that have spending the EU budget (distribu-
tive/redistributive policy fields) as its core task organise 
the biggest share of the groups where societal actors 
are included as experts (Table 4).  
We also note that only two of the DGs that are high 
end users of expert groups in their policy making seem 
to exclude societal actors—this is the case for policy 
making for taxation and customs, and for the produc-
tion of EU statistics. Already from this overview we see 
that the Commission does not approach the inclusion 
of societal actors according to one overall “logic”. On 
the whole there are few obvious common characteris-
tics to the DGs that are most open for interaction with 
industry/enterprise, NGOs or other societal actors 
through their use of expert groups. This underscores 
the need to identify underlying factors that can ac-
count for this variation. 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of European Commission expert groups with (in blue) and without (in red) participation of 
societal actors according to DG (2007). Only DGs with more than 5 expert groups included. Source: Own data. 
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Table 4. Number of expert groups with participation from societal actors according to type of DG (Main Task of DG) N = 1236. 
 Type of DGs—classified according to main task 
Total Expert groups with 
participation from  
External 
Relations 
Internal 
policy and 
services 
Legislative Regulation/ 
Enforcement 
Research Spending 
Societal actors (overall) 14 8 143 112 3 218 498 
% within societal actors 2,8% 1,6% 28,7% 22,5% ,6% 43,8% 100,0% 
NGOs 11 1 84 55 3 53 207 
% within NGO 5,3% ,5% 40,6% 26,6% 1,4% 25,6% 100,0% 
Social Partners/ Unions 5 1 36 40 0 64 146 
% within Social 
Partners/Unions 
3,4% ,7% 24,7% 27,4% ,0% 43,8% 100,0% 
Industry/Enterprise 6 3 87 81 3 172 352 
% within 
Industry/Enterprise 
1,7% ,9% 24,7% 23,0% ,9% 48,9% 100,0% 
Consumers 0 0 18 53 0 25 96 
% within Consumers ,0% ,0% 18,8% 55,2% ,0% 26,0% 100,0% 
Practitioners  7 6 47 44 0 52 156 
% within Practitioners 4,5% 3,8% 30,1% 28,2% ,0% 33,3% 100,0% 
Source: Own data. 
Table 5. Regression analysis of inclusion of societal actors in Commission expert groups. OLS regression. N = 1127. 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) ,053 ,079   
Legal competences in policy area ,015 ,017 ,029 Not sign 
DG main task (Spending=1, Else=0) ,118 ,033 ,115 *** 
Policy cycle      
- Assist in policy preparation  ,079 ,034 ,078 * 
- Coordinate/exchange views -,032 ,034 -,032 Not sign 
- Draft implementation  ,025 ,041 ,019 Not sign 
- Monitoring national level -,083 ,044 -,054 Not sign 
Formal (1) /informal (0) group ,006 ,035 ,005 Not sign 
Permanent (1) /temporary (0) group  ,024 ,032 ,024 Not sign 
Policy Age ,001 ,001 ,034 Not sign 
DG unit environment 
- Number of interest groups 
,002 ,000 ,268 
 
*** 
Adjusted R2= .10     
Notes: * significant at 0.05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level; *** significant at 0.005 level; Source: Own data. 
4.2. Factors Affecting Inclusion of Societal Actors in 
Expert Group System 
Our multivariate analyses (Table 5), in which the explan-
atory value of the different predictors is assessed simul-
taneously, show that overall our expectations concern-
ing the impact of organisational factors on patterns of 
inclusion are only partially supported. External pressures 
that DG units face is the single most important factor 
that can explain why some DG units incorporate societal 
actors as experts in the policy process—executive units 
seem to respond to pressure for participation and the 
availability of expertise from organised societal interests 
in their task environment7. The more organised interest 
groups there are in a DG’s policy domain, the more it 
opens up for participation of societal actors in the policy 
process. We find this link for all types of societal actor 
participation (see Table 6).This ties in with Chalmers’ 
(2013) findings on how interest groups characteristics 
(resources and European orientation) affect the number 
of seats interest organisations get in Commission expert 
groups (Chalmers, 2013). Yet, our findings do not neces-
                                                          
7 These findings are consistent with Gornitzka and Sverdrup 
(2011) who find similar effect of this variable as well as no sig-
nificant effects of portfolio age and legal competences.  
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sarily imply that the Commission’s interaction with soci-
ety is environmentally determined. Nor does the fact 
that interest group density DGs face in their task envi-
ronment is a significant factor accounting for variation in 
patterns of participation give us reason to believe that 
the overall patterns of participation are the conse-
quence of “agency capture” by strong corporate actors.  
Our findings show that also characteristics on the 
side of the executive are factors that affect patterns of 
inclusion. As expected, spending DGs are more inclusive 
than DGs with other tasks, also when controlled for oth-
er factors. DG units also seem to deem the expertise of 
societal groups as more relevant and legitimate in the 
preparatory stage than in the implementing stages of 
the policy process (weak, but statistically significant ef-
fect). Yet, the considerable diversity in the use of socie-
tal actors in expert groups within the different parts of 
the Commission is far from being fully accounted for by 
this multivariate model. Moreover, when we unpack the 
category “societal actors” some differences in the “logic 
of inclusion” of DGs come to the fore (Table 6). 
Firstly, although formal legal parameters for the 
Commission’s autonomy in general do not affect its pro-
pensity for interacting with societal actors in its expert 
group system (Table 5), DGs more often include business 
and consumer organisations in policy areas where the 
Commission has a stronger basis for independent action 
than in areas where EU competences are low. This sup-
ports the idea that both sides of the market (suppliers 
and consumers) are part of a transnational expertise 
structure that the Commission as a responsive and re-
sponsible executive can draw on in areas that form the 
core of the EU’s competences. However, for DG units’ 
openness towards social partners/unions and NGOs 
there are no significant effects of formal competences 
when controlling for other factors. Hence, we could ar-
gue that the DGs’ behaviour does not seem to go in the 
direction of reproducing corporatist arrangements with 
unions and employer organisation in areas where the EU 
has taken over the competences from the member states.  
Secondly, the DGs’ type of task has a relatively strong 
effect on inclusion of private sector actors and NGOs—
but in different ways: NGOs are less likely to be included 
in expert venues for DGs with distributive tasks than for 
other DGs, whereas industry and enterprises are more 
likely to be included. As the simple distribution displayed 
in Table 4 underlines, NGOs are present in expert groups 
for DGs that produce new EU legislation.  
This brings us to a third relevant finding on the 
complex relationship between stages in the policy pro-
cess and inclusion of societal actors. Overall it is clear 
that DGs differentiate between social partners versus 
private sector actors according to what kind of role 
they assign to expert groups. Social partners are 
brought into these venues for assisting the Commission 
in monitoring implementation and developments at 
the national level. DGs tend to exclude both business 
and professional associations from this type of exper-
tise function. The latter two groups are significantly 
more likely to be included when the Commission wants 
assistance in preparing policies (Table 6). Commission 
DGs include social partners also in groups that have a 
more general function facilitating the “exchange of 
views”, and less specialised expert venues. So the inclu-
sion of business actors is not ubiquitous, but clustered 
around some stages of the policy process over others. 
For NGOs’ participation there are no significant effects 
of this aspect of the Commission’s task structure. 
Table 6. Summary of main findings—Regression analysis of various societal actors to commission expert groups: Social 
Partners/Unions; Industry/enterprise; Consumers; NGOs. Logistic regression*. N = 1127. 
Model 
Social 
partners 
Unions 
Industry/ 
Enterprise 
Consumers NGOs Practitioners 
Legal competences in policy area  
/ 
 
POS 
 
POS 
 
/ 
 
/ 
DG main task  
(spending=1, else=0) 
 
/ 
 
POS 
 
/ 
 
NEG 
 
/ 
Policy cycle       
- Assist in policy preparation  / POS / / POS 
- Coordinate/exchange views POS / / / / 
- Draft implementation  / / / / / 
- Monitoring national level POS NEG / / NEG 
Formal (1) / informal (0) group POS / POS POS NEG 
Permanent(1) /temporary (0 group)  / / POS / / 
Portfolio age POS POS POS / / 
DG unit environment 
- Number of interest groups 
 
POS 
 
POS 
 
POS 
 
POS 
 
POS 
Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 .13 .19 .24 .10 .07 
Notes: / = Not significant; POS = positive coefficients, significant; NEG = negative coefficients, significant; * See Appen-
dix for full results from regression analyses. Source: Own data. 
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Fourthly, the extent to which the Commission 
opens up for societal actor participation varies system-
atically according to the institutionalisation and the 
maturity of the DGs. When controlling for the effect of 
the other variables, the DGs operating in mature port-
folios where the Commission has a long history are 
more likely to include social partners, business, and 
consumer organisations than DGs with responsibilities 
in more recent additions to the Commission’s portfoli-
os. Thus far we can conclude that a DG unit’s “coming 
of age” matters for its external links to some of the so-
cietal actors, but not for all. The institutionalisation of 
the expert group itself also has significant effect: unlike 
scientists that tend more often to appear in informal 
groups (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2010), the participa-
tion of societal actors is anchored in formal settings. 
There are two exceptions to this main pattern—for 
business inclusion this variable is not significant whereas 
practitioners/professional associations are less likely to 
be included in expert venues that are formalised. 
5. Conclusions 
The analysis of patterns of participation in the Commis-
sion’s expert groups portrays the Commission as an 
open executive that has established an extensive ad-hoc 
organisation for policy making and implementation. This 
system includes societal actors to a large extent—such 
actors took part in almost 500 groups and committees 
(40 per cent of all expert groups). It seems that this 
mode of interaction has become a standard operating 
procedure for the European executive to involve societal 
actors in the policy process along with other modes of 
consultation (Greenwood 2011). The pattern of inclusion 
of societal actors we find is consistent with the Commis-
sion acting as a responsive and responsible executive 
that opens up its expert venues to interest organisa-
tions’ specialised knowledge and expertise as well as to 
a heterogeneous set of societal interests. 
Within the set of societal actors that are included in 
the expert groups, business actors are as a single group 
the most prevalent. Seemingly these results lend sup-
port to the claim that European business has privileged 
access to EU governance sites and expert venues. 
However, this conclusion needs to be qualified based 
on our observations. Firstly, taken together, NGOs, and 
consumer and practitioners’ organisations are included 
in the expert group system as frequently as businesses 
and enterprises. Secondly, as demonstrated in previous 
analysis (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2011), in the total sys-
tem of expert groups, business actors are outnum-
bered by representatives from national ministries and 
agencies—national level executives are the Commis-
sion’s prime interlocutor in this venue. More than a 
business bias the Commission has a “national executive 
bias”—the expert groups system is primarily (but not 
only) the “asteroid belt” of the EUs executive centre 
that links it to national administrations. Thirdly, we find 
that expert groups where societal actors participate 
are organised arenas for co-production and co-
implementation of policy. Several types of societal ac-
tors—business and enterprise, social partners, consum-
er organisations, NGOs—interact with DG units within 
these multi-actor, ad-hoc venues, along with scientists 
and practitioners. These data of course cannot tells us 
whether there are other systematic biases, for instance 
according to interest group resources (Chalmers, 2013), 
in whom the Commission counts as experts. We have 
seen that DGs respond to the density of interest organi-
sation in their policy environment. Still, the Commis-
sion’s DG units themselves control the organisation and 
composition of their groups and the overall patterns of 
inclusion/exclusion of societal actors are partly con-
sistent with a norm of participatory diversity and repre-
sentation of heterogeneous interests and perspectives. 
As concerns “corporate capture” of expert venues what 
we do see is that business interests are within the group 
setting more often than not matched and mixed with 
other non-governmental actors. 
The second major pattern is the variegated ways in 
which the Commission interacts with European societal 
actors through the use of expert groups. There is a 
striking heterogeneity in the way that societal involve-
ment in the Commission’s expert groups is clustered 
around certain policy fields. We have also seen that the 
political organisation that DG units are faced with in 
their portfolio environment affects their propensity to 
include societal actors as experts—the denser a policy 
domain is populated with interest groups at the EU 
level, the more the DGs are likely to open up for their 
participation.  
The multivariate analysis shows that executive ad-
ministrative units’ varying competences, task struc-
tures, and level of institutionalisation are relevant de-
terminants of societal inclusion, but these organisational 
factors matter in different ways for different types of 
actors. This suggests that there are systematic differ-
ences in the logic underlying the DGs’ interaction with 
societal groups in this particular organised setting and 
that such actors play varying roles in the executive poli-
tics of the EU through their participation in the expert 
groups. An observable indication is the way that the 
Commission’s task structure matters as a conditioning 
factor—business actors tend to be included as experts 
by the DGs in the preparatory stage and for drafting 
implementing measures, and excluded from monitor-
ing policy implementation. Social partners, on the oth-
er hand, are deemed as relevant and legitimate experts 
and likely to be included in monitoring implementa-
tion. Our analysis also shows that the maturity of the 
Commission’s DGs is important for how it interacts 
with its environment. The more mature portfolios will 
tend to include social partners, business and consumer 
organisations.  
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At the level of expert groups we also see the effects 
of institutionalisation: our findings support the view 
that the Commission has institutionalised its involve-
ment with social partners, consumer organisations, and 
NGOs. The role of such actors in the policy process is 
formally anchored and seems to be sustained by bu-
reaucratic norms, practices, and routines in some parts 
of the Commission. The Commission as the core execu-
tive is thus selectively open for societal involvement in 
its expert groups system. However, this bureaucratic 
openness is not erratic but patterned, clustered, and 
conditioned by structural factors that affect how the 
Commission as a multi-organisation operates.  
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Appendix. Regression models of inclusion of societal actors in the European Commission’s expert groups. Logistic 
regression. 
 
A.1 Social partners and Unions 
N=1127 B S.E. Sig. 
Exp(B) 
Odds ratio 
 
Legal competences in policy area -,108 ,111 ,332 ,898 
DG main task (Spending=1, Else=0) ,006 ,224 ,979 1,006 
Policy cycle  
- Assist in policy preparation 
,045 ,220 ,838 1,046 
- Coordinate/exchange views ,833 ,231 ,000 2,300 
- Draft implementation -,302 ,284 ,289 ,740 
- Monitoring national level ,595 ,257 ,020 1,814 
Formal/informal group 1,186 ,193 ,000 3,274 
Portfolio age  ,028 ,008 ,001 1,028 
DG unit environment 
- Number of interest groups 
,004 ,002 ,049 1,004 
 
Constant -4,057 ,546 ,000 ,017 
 
A.2 Industry and Enterprise 
N=1127 B S.E. Sig. 
Exp(B) 
Odds ratio 
 Legal competences in policy area ,466 ,105 ,000 1,593 
DG main task (Spending=1, Else=0) 1,082 ,171 ,000 2,950 
Policy cycle  
- Assist in policy preparation 
,566 ,172 ,001 1,761 
- Coordinate/exchange views ,111 ,171 ,518 1,117 
- Draft implementation ,180 ,199 ,367 1,197 
- Monitoring national level -1,098 ,258 ,000 ,333 
Formal/informal group ,259 ,157 ,100 1,296 
Portfolio age  ,017 ,006 ,002 1,018 
DG unit environment 
- Number of interest groups 
,011 ,002 ,000 1,011 
 Constant -4,582 ,478 ,000 ,010 
A.3 Consumer organisations 
N=1127 B S.E. Sig. 
Exp(B) 
Odds ratio 
 Legal competences in policy area ,930 ,177 ,000 2,534 
DG main task (Spending=1, Else=0) -,119 ,337 ,725 ,888 
Policy cycle  
- Assist in policy preparation 
-,188 ,286 ,512 ,829 
- Coordinate/exchange views ,450 ,299 ,133 1,569 
- Draft implementation ,056 ,327 ,865 1,057 
- Monitoring national level -,902 ,493 ,067 ,406 
Permanent /temporary group 1,101 ,252 ,000 3,008 
Formal/informal group  ,599 ,274 ,029 1,821 
Portfolio age ,018 ,009 ,046 1,018 
DG unit environment 
- Number of interest groups 
,015 ,003 ,000 1,016 
 Constant -8,235 ,838 ,000 ,000 
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A.4 Nongovernmental organisations 
N=1127 B S.E. Sig. 
Exp(B) 
Odds ratio 
 Legal competences in policy area ,075 ,104 ,471 1,078 
DG main task (Spending=1, Else=0) -,879 ,219 ,000 ,415 
Policy cycle  
- Assist in policy preparation 
-,132 ,191 ,490 ,876 
- Coordinate/exchange views ,299 ,192 ,119 1,349 
- Draft implementation ,166 ,219 ,447 1,181 
- Monitoring national level ,183 ,249 ,461 1,201 
Formal/informal group ,385 ,176 ,029 1,469 
Portfolio age  -,009 ,006 ,122 ,991 
DG unit environment 
- Number of interest groups 
,009 ,002 ,000 1,010 
 Constant -2,427 ,453 ,000 ,088 
 
A.5 Practitioners—professional associations 
N=1127 B S.E. Sig. 
Exp(B) 
Odds ratio 
 Legal competences in policy area -,088 ,114 ,441 ,916 
DG main task (Spending=1, Else=0) -,195 ,213 ,360 ,823 
Policy cycle  
- Assist in policy preparation 
,667 ,220 ,002 1,947 
- Coordinate/exchange views -,208 ,215 ,334 ,812 
- Draft implementation ,268 ,254 ,290 1,308 
- Monitoring national level -,758 ,349 ,030 ,469 
Formal/informal group -,528 ,232 ,023 ,590 
Portfolio age  ,008 ,007 ,272 1,008 
DG unit environment 
- Number of interest groups 
,004 ,002 ,032 1,004 
 (Constant -2,312 ,520 ,000 ,099 
 
